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Abstract: In a multiperiod setting, decision-makers can learn about the consequences of their
decisions through experimentation. In this paper we examine how in a two-party system
polarization and political instability affect learning through experimentation. We distinguish
two cases: (1) the decision to be made is not salient and does not affect the outcome of the
following elections (exogenous elections) and (2) the decision is salient and the election
outcome depends on it (endogenous elections). We show that while the possibility of learning
increases activism, the existence of political instability distorts learning. Furthermore, in
contrast to the existing literature, we demonstrate that, when elections are exogenous,
polarization between political parties does not always decrease active learning. In the case
with endogenous elections we find that electoral concerns may induce candidates not to
experiment, even if the majority of voters prefers activism.
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21. Introduction
The consequences of many decisions are surrounded by uncertainty. In a multi-period setting,
decision-makers can learn about the consequences of decisions through experimentation. Two
types of learning through experimentation can be distinguished: passive learning and active
learning. In case of passive learning, the decision-maker’s action is not induced by the
possibility of learning. In case of active learning, experimentation reduces the current utility
of the decision-maker, but it leads to information that can be used to improve future decision
making. There exists a small but interesting literature on active learning. Early papers are
Prescott (1972) and Rothschild (1974). The concept of active learning can be applied to
several situations. For example, it can help to understand how consumers make decisions
about buying goods with uncertain quality (Grossman, Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1977) or how
firms come to know the demand curves of their products (Rothschild, 1974). Concerning
economic policy, economists have studied the normative implications of active learning.
Bertocchi and Spagat (1997) argue that the possibility of learning through experimentation
provides a rationale for shock therapy in transition economies. In another paper (Bertocchi
and Spagat, 1993), they study the implications of active learning for the optimality of money
supply rules. So far, little attention has been paid to the implications of active learning for
positive approaches to the making of policy.1
In this paper, we apply the concept of learning to decision making in a political
setting. More specifically, we address the question how in a two-party system polarization and
political instability affect learning through experimentation. To answer this question, we
construct a highly stylized, two-period model of the behavior of a policy maker who has to
make a decision about a public project.  This project can be either implemented or rejected.
Initially, the consequences of the project are uncertain. However, if the policy maker
3implements the project, she learns its consequences.  In the next section, we show that when
the policy maker is certain to stay in office, the possibility of learning increases activism. This
result is completely in line with the existing literature on active learning. In Section 3, we
introduce elections into the model. The policy maker in period 1 faces an exogenous
probability that in period 2 she is replaced with a policy maker with different preferences. We
expected that uncertainty about the future preferences of the policy maker would decrease
activism (as in Bertocchi and Spagat, 1997). However, this appeared not to be the case
generally. When there is a large probability that a policy maker, who is biased against
implementation, is succeeded by a policy maker, who is biased towards implementation,
learning considerations increase activism. The reason is that by implementing the project the
policy maker in period 1 can persuade her successor not to implement the project in period 2.
Experimentation is thus sometimes induced by a “let the other learn” effect.  In Section 4, we
endogenize elections. Endogenizing elections has two implications. First, provided that the
two candidates choose different policies, voters can choose the candidate whose policy is in
line with their preferences. Second, policy choice in period 1 may have an effect on the
probability that the incumbent will be reelected.  We show that electoral concerns may induce
candidates not to experiment, even if a majority of voters prefers activism.
The motivation for this paper is twofold. First, we want to understand how electoral
competition impacts information collection about policy consequences. This is important,
because the quality of policy often depends on the information the policy decision has been
based on. Second, in several countries reforms are considered aimed at facilitating learning.
The Netherlands, for example, intends to adopt a "performance" accounting system. The hope
is that continuous evaluation of public policies leads to better policy decisions. Studies, like
the present one, may give insight into the possible obstacles to such desirable reforms.
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 An exception is Bertocchi (1993), who uses results from the theory of active learning to provide an explanation
for existing systems of  public debt management.
42. Basic model
This section discusses a simple two-period model, in which a policy maker must make a
decision about a public project. In each period t, the policy maker can choose between two
alternatives: implementation, denoted by 1=tx , and rejection, denoted by 0=tx . When the
policy maker chooses 1=tx , her payoff is
µµ +== pxU tt )1(   (1)
where p denotes the policy maker’s predisposition towards the project, and µ is a stochastic
term, reflecting that the consequences of the project are surrounded by uncertainty. We
assume that µ is uniformly distributed on [-h, h]. When the policy maker rejects the project,
her payoff is 0)0( ==tt xU  by normalization. Under full information, the policy maker
would choose 1=tx  if µ > -p. However, at the beginning of period 1, the policy maker does
not observe µ. Throughout this paper it is assumed that |p| < h. This assumption ensures that
the realization of µ determines whether or not the policy maker benefits from undertaking the
project. As a consequence, the policy maker benefits from information about µ . For
notational simplicity, we assume that the policy maker does not discount the future. Her total
utility is thus given by ∑
=
2
1t
tU . The policy maker can learn the value of µ by implementing the
project in the first period. If learning takes place, the decision about the project in period 2 is
made under certainty.
Formally, the stages of the game can be described as follows:
1) Nature draws µ   from a uniform distribution with range ],[ hh− .
52) The policy maker makes a decision about the project in period 1: 11 =x  or 01 =x .
3) If 11 =x , nature reveals the value of µ  to the policy maker.
4) The policy maker makes a decision about the project in period 2: 12 =x  or 02 =x .
Solution of the basic model
In this subsection we show how the opportunity to learn affects the policy decision in period
1. More specifically, we derive the value of p for which the policy maker is indifferent
between 01 =x  and 11 =x . To ensure a time consistent solution, we start with analyzing the
second period.
In period 2 the decision about the project depends on the decision the policy maker has
made in period 1. When 01 =x , the policy maker has not obtained information about µ , and
chooses 12 =x  if and only if 0>p .
2
 When 11 =x , the policy maker knows µ  and chooses
12 =x  if and only if p−>µ .
Now consider the policy maker’s decision about the project in period 1. Anticipating
her decision about the project in period 2, the expected payoff to the policy maker when she
chooses 11 =x  is
)6(
4
1
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When the policymaker chooses 01 =x , her expected payoff is 0, if 0≤p , and her expected
payoff is p, if 0>p . Because the second term of the RHS of the first row in (2) is positive
6(expected utility in period 2 is greater than zero), 11 =x  yields a higher expected payoff than
01 =x , if 0>p . Hence, if 0>p , then 11 =x . When 0≤p , 11 =x  yields a higher expected
payoff than 01 =x  if the last expression in (2) is positive, implying:3
hpp I )223( +−=>      (3)
where Ip  denotes the predisposition of a policy maker who is indifferent between 01 =x  and
11 =x . There are two alternative ways of interpreting 
Ip . First, we can interpret Ip  as
giving the type of policy makers, in terms of their predisposition towards a given project,
who choose  11 =x . Second, we can interpret 
Ip  as giving the type of projects, in terms of
their attractiveness, which are implemented by a given policy maker. The first interpretation
implies that a decrease in Ip  means that more policy makers choose 11 =x . The second
interpretation implies that a decrease in Ip  means that more projects are implemented by the
policy maker.
It is easy to see from (3) that 0<Ip . The implication is that a policy maker who is
biased against implementation may choose 11 =x . On the basis of (3), we can make a clear
distinction between two well-known concepts in the literature on learning. Passive learning
takes place if 0>p : the opportunity to learn affects the policy decision in period 2, but not
the policy decision in period 1. Active learning takes place if the opportunity to learn affects
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2
 Without loss of generality, we assume that when the policy maker is indifferent between 0=tx  and 1=tx ,
she chooses 0=tx .
3
 The last expression in (2) is also positive if hp )223( −−< . However, our assumptions concerning the
values of p and h exclude this solution.
7the policy in period 1. This occurs if ( ]0,223( hp +−∈ . When there is no scope for learning
(for instance, because a project cannot be repealed), 01 =x  if 0<p .
Equation (3) implies that Ip  decreases with h. Thus, the higher is the level of
uncertainty about the consequences of the project, the less restrictive is (3). The intuition
behind this result is that the benefits of learning increase with uncertainty. When
policymakers are risk-averse, the benefits of active learning are even higher. However, with
risk-aversion, more uncertainty directly reduces the attractiveness of implementation.
3. Uncertainty about the Preferences of the Future Policy Maker
In this section we introduce elections into the basic model in order to analyze the effect of
elections on the condition for active learning. In the augmented model, elections are held at
the end of period 1. Two policy makers compete for office: policy maker P, whose
preferences are described by (1), and policy maker R, whose preferences are described by
µµ +== rxU trt )1(  and )0( =trt xU . The parameter r )( hr < denotes policy maker R ’s
predisposition towards the project. The deviation of p from r can be interpreted as a measure
of polarization. In period 1, policy maker P is in office. The probability that in period 2 P
stays in office is denoted by π . The probability that R wins the elections is therefore given by
π−1 . In this section, we make the strong assumption that π  is exogenous. The motivation for
this assumption is that policymakers make numerous decisions that do not receive attention
from the media. It is unlikely that those decisions affect voter behavior. Concerning salient
policy decisions, the assumption that π  is exogenous seems implausible. For this reason, we
relax this assumption in the next section.
Solution of the Augmented Model
8In period 2 the decision about the project depends on the decision policy maker P has made in
period 1 and on the election outcome. Suppose 11 =x . Clearly, when policy maker P wins the
elections, she chooses 12 =x  if  and only if p−>µ . Likewise, when policy maker R wins the
elections, he chooses 12 =x  if and only if r−>µ . Now suppose 01 =x . In this case, the
policy maker, who has won the elections, chooses 12 =x  if her predisposition towards the
project is higher than zero.
In period 1, policy maker P’s expected total utility is
           ( )222 )1(])1(26[
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when she chooses 11 =x . When P chooses 01 =x , her total expected utility depends on the
signs of  p and r [total expected utility is zero when 0, ≤rp ; it is pπ when 0>p  and 0≤r ;
it is p)1( π− when 0≤p  and 0>r ; it is p when 0, >rp ]. Using (4), it is easy to show that
it is optimal for P to choose 11 =x , when 0>p . When 0≤p  and 0≤r , 11 =x  yields a
higher total utility than 01 =x  if (4) is higher than zero, implying:
0)1(])1(26[ 222 >−−+−++ rhprhp πππ . (5)
When 0≤p  and 0>r , 11 =x  yields a higher total utility than 01 =x  if (4) is higher than
p)1( π− , implying:
0)1(])1(22)21[( 222 >−−+−+++ rhprhp ππππ . (6)
9To examine the conditions under which policy maker P chooses 11 =x , we again analyze the
value of  p for which P is indifferent between choosing 01 =x  and choosing 11 =x . Let 
I
rp 0≤
denote this value of p, given that 0≤r . Equation (5) implicitly defines Irp 0≤  as a function of
r, h and π . Application of the implicit function theorem shows that (see Appendix A):
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The partial derivatives in (7) say that Irp 0≤  increases with rp − . Hence, when 0≤r ,
polarization reduces the incentive for learning actively. The partial derivative in (8) shows
that a higher probability of reelection increases the incentive for learning actively. The
intuition behind these two results is straightforward. Uncertainty about the preferences of the
future policy maker reduces the benefits of learning. As a consequence, more polarization and
a higher probability of losing office weaken the incentive to learn. In our model, learning
requires implementation of projects. Hence, more polarization and a lower probability of
reelection imply that implementation of projects becomes less attractive. The partial
derivative in (9) confirms our earlier result that a higher degree of uncertainty encourages
learning.
10
In Appendix B, we repeat the analysis for the case 0>r . Unsurprisingly, the results
concerning the effects of r on Irp 0>  are qualitatively the same as implied by (7). There
remains the analysis of the effect of an increase in r on Ip , when 0=r . When r goes to zero,
(5) reduces to 06 22 >++ hhppπ  and (6) reduces to 0)21(2 22 >+++ hhpp ππ , so that
π
π hp Ir
)93( 2
0
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It is easy to show that, for 10 << π , the expression in (11) is smaller than the expression in
(10). The incentive for active learning is thus stronger when policy maker R is marginally
biased towards implementation of the project than when he is marginally biased towards
rejection of the project. The reason is that, when 0>r ,  01 =x  induces policy maker R to
choose 12 =x  if in office. By choosing 11 =x , policy maker P reduces the probability that
policy maker R chooses 12 =x . This increases her utility, because 0<p . In addition to this
"let the other learn" effect, policy maker P learns µ  herself by choosing 11 =x . A
comparison between (3) and (11) shows that polarization may encourage policy maker P to
choose 11 =x  rather than 01 =x . This illustrates the potential importance of the "let the other
learn" effect.
Figure 1 summarizes our result about the effect of polarization on active learning. In
general, a marginal increase in the degree of polarization reduces policy maker P’s willingness
to choose 11 =x . However, because 
Ip  experiences a negative jump at 0=r , there exists a
11
range of values of 0>r , for which active learning is more likely in a polarized system than in
a system where policy maker P is certain to stay in office.
Figure 1. Effect of polarization on active learning
The graph is drawn for h = 1, 
2
1
=π .
4. Endogenous elections
In this section we relax the assumption that the election outcome is exogenous. Moreover, we
allow voters to choose the policy maker in period 1. Thus, two elections are held. The first
election determines the policy maker in period 1. The second determines the policy maker in
period 2. At the elections, each voter casts her ballot for the candidate whose policy yields
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highest expected utility. Voter v ’s preferences are described by µµ +== vxu tvt )|1(  and
0)0( ==tv xu t . We assume a continuum of voters in terms of v . It is easy to see that in this
setting the median voter’s vote is decisive. Throughout, we assume that 
2
1
=π  if the median
voter is indifferent between P  and R . Let m  denote the median voter’s predisposition
towards the project. We assume that m  is common knowledge and that
0)223( <<+−< rhp 4 and rmp << . The implication of the first condition is that in a
setting without elections the policy makers would have made different policy choices: R
would have chosen 11 =x , while P  would have chosen 01 =x . Notice that we assume that,
like both policy makers, the median voter is negatively predisposed towards the project. The
reason is that we focus on active learning.
As we will show below, with endogenous elections, the election outcome in period 2
depends on policy in period 1. As a consequence, the policy maker in period 1 can influence
her probability of re-election. We assume that policy makers receive (ego) rents from holding
office. More specifically, we add i
t
dumλ  to the utility function of each policy maker, where
i
t
dum  is a dummy variable, which takes the value one if policy maker i  holds office in period
t
 and takes the value zero otherwise. The parameter λ  is a measure of how much value the
policy maker attaches to holding office.
Solution of the model with endogenous elections
Suppose that policy maker P  chooses 01 =x  and policy maker R  chooses 11 =x . In this
case policy is always in line with the policy preferred by the median voter. When the median
voter prefers policy 11 =x  to 01 =x , she votes for R . In period 2 the election outcome
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 The second term in the expression is equal to the predisposition of the policy maker, who is indifferent between
13
depends on µ . If m−>µ  the median voter votes for R  and if m−≤µ  she votes for P . If
the median voter prefers 01 =x  to 11 =x , she votes for P  in the first elections.
Let us now identify the conditions under which R  chooses 11 =x , given that P
chooses 01 =x  and hm )223( +−> . When R  chooses  01 =x ,  then 12 =Rdum  with
probability 
2
1
 and 0
2
=
Rdum  with probability 
2
1
. When R  chooses 11 =x , then 12 =
Rdum  if
],( pm −−∈µ , 0
2
=
Rdum  if ],( mr −−∈µ  and 1
2
=
Rdum  with probability 
2
1
 if ],[ rh −−∈µ
and if ],( hp−∈µ  (see figure 2 below).
Figure 2. Winners of the elections depending on the value of µ
h−                      0  r−               m−                     p−         h
Hence, when policy maker R  chooses 11 =x , his expected total utility is
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undertaking learning and not doing that in the basic case without the elections.
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prob. 1
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When R  chooses 01 =x , his expected utility is equal to λλ 2
1
+ . Consequently, R
prefers 11 =x  to 01 =x  if expression (12) is larger than λ2
3
. It is easy to see that for a large
enough value of λ , R  chooses 01 =x  if )(2
1 prm +< , i.e. if the preferences of the median
voter are closer to those of P  than to those of R . Thus, although the median voter prefers
11 =x  to 01 =x  neither R  nor P  chooses 11 =x . The possible choice of R  for 01 =x  is
induced by electoral considerations: 11 =x  would reduce his probability of winning the
second elections.
Turn now to the conditions under which P  chooses 01 =x  given that R  chooses
11 =x . Following the same steps as above, it is straightforward to derive that a median voter,
who prefers 01 =x  to 11 =x , may not be able to choose her policy when neither R  nor P
chooses 01 =x . This occurs for a large enough utility of holding office λ  and if the
preferences of the median voter are closer to those of R  than to those of P.
From the above analysis two results emerge. First, when polarization induces the two
candidates to choose different policies voters are always able to choose their most preferred
policy. In this case, polarization does not distort active learning, in the sense that society
engages in active learning when a majority of voters prefers active learning to no learning.
Second, electoral considerations may induce candidates to choose the same policy. Then, too
little or too much learning may occur from the median voter’s point of view.
5. Concluding Remarks
Learning through experimentation –or active learning- occurs when a decision maker makes a
decision that reduces current utility, but leads to information that is expected to improve
future decision making. In this paper, we have addressed the question how polarization and
15
political instability affect learning through experimentation in a two-party system where a
policy maker with different preferences may succeed the incumbent. Two cases have been
distinguished.
First, we have analyzed a model in which a policymaker must make a binary decision
about a project, which does not affect her chances of reelection. We have shown that in this
case a higher degree of polarization generally reduces the incumbent’s incentive to learn
through experimentation. However, the relationship between polarization and learning
through experimentation is not continuous. It matters whether the successor is biased against
implementation or is biased towards implementation. When the successor is biased towards
implementation, the incumbent may have a stronger incentive to implement the project than
when the successor is biased against the project.
Next, we have analyzed a model in which elections revolve around the project under
consideration. We have shown that when the two candidates choose different policies, policy
always accords with the policy most preferred by a majority of voters. However, electoral
considerations may induce parties to choose the same policy. The reason is that a candidate,
who prefers learning through experimentation from an ideological point of view, may reduce
her chances of reelection by implementing the project. We have argued that when the two
candidates choose the same policy, policy may differ from the policy most preferred by a
majority of voters.
Our analysis is based on several restrictive assumptions. Some of them are made for
simplification and are innocuous. For example, we have assumed that policy makers do not
discount the future and that once the project has been implemented its consequences are
known. Relaxing these assumptions does not affect our results qualitatively. Two other
assumptions are less innocuous. First, our model revolves around a single project. As a
consequence, voters evaluate candidates on the basis of a single issue. In reality, policy
16
makers make decisions about numerous projects, old and new ones. It is easy to show that
when policy makers must make decisions about more than one project, voters sometimes face
a trade-off between learning about new projects and repealing unfavorable, old projects.
Second, our model focuses on projects that can be either implemented or not. Often
policy makers must make binary decisions. However, it is unclear that our results generalize
to decisions about continuous variables.
Though our results are derived from a highly stylized model, we believe that they are
important for two reasons.  First, our analysis gives insights into the way polarization and
political instability affect policy making under uncertainty. Second, our results have
normative implications. Nowadays, several scientists are thinking about ways to transform the
public sector into a learning organization (OECD, 1999). Our analysis points out that
polarization and political instability are potential obstacles to such a transformation.
17
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Appendix A.
In this appendix we derive (7) - (9). Straightforward differentiation of (5) with respect to r ,
π  and h  results in the following expressions:
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the denominator is positive (see (i)  in this appendix).
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Appendix B
In this appendix we derive the analogue of expression (7) for the case 0>r . Let 00 >>Irp
denote the value of p , for which P  is indifferent between choosing 11 =x  and choosing
01 =x  given that 0>r . Equation (6) implicitly defines Irp 0>  as a function of r , π  and h .
Straightforward differentiation of (6) with respect to r , taking account of the implicit function
theorem, results in the following expression:
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